GAP.7
Bremen 2009

KOLLOQUIEN / COLLOQUIA

A	**Wozu Philosophiegeschichte?** **Das Beispiel des Aristoteles** Begrüßung und Eröffnung des Kolloquiums / Welcome and Opening of the Colloquium **Ulrich Nortmann**: *Systematiker und Historiker der Philosophie: Was sehen die einen, das die anderen nicht sehen?* Diskussion / Discussion **Alan Code**: *Aristotle on Explanatory Grounding of Existence* Diskussion / Discussion Kaffeepause / Coffee break **Christof Rapp**: *On Aristotelian Themes in Contemporary Ethics* Diskussion / Discussion Abschlussdiskussion / Final discussion	**Monday / Monday, 14.09.** **14:30 – 17:30** **Haus der Wissenschaft** 14:30 – 14:40 14:40 – 15:15 15:15 – 15:25 15:30 – 16:05 16:05 – 16:15 16:15 – 16:35 16:35 – 17:10 17:10 – 17:30	
B	**Relativism about Truth** **Max Kölbel**: *Context Sensitivity, Relativism and Future Contingents* Short break **Manuel Garcia-Carpintero:** *Relativism, the Open Future, and Propositional Truth* Coffee break General discussion	**Montag / Monday, 14.09.** **14:30 – 17:30** **Haus der Wissenschaft** 14:30 – 15:20 15:20 – 15:25 15:25 – 16:15 16:15 – 16:30 16:30 – 17:30	
C	**Evolution and Morality** **Jason McKenzie Alexander:** *Moral Behaviour: The Remarkable Outcome of Imitation in Socially Structured Enviroments* **Shaun Nichols:** *Ethics and the Psychology of Moral Luck* **Stephen Stich:** *The Evolution of Morality?*	**Montag /Monday, 14.09.** **14:30 – 17:30** **Stadtwaage** 14:30 – 15:30 15:30 – 16:30 16:30 – 17:30	

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D	**Wissenschaft und Philosophie für eine komplexe Welt** **Manfred Stöckler**: Einleitung **Stefan Bornholdt**: *Dynamik komplexer Systeme: Modelle und Sichtweisen der Physik* **Stephan Hartmann**: *Strukturelle Erklärungen – Wissenschaftsphilosophische Überlegungen* Replik Stefan Bornholdt Plenumsdiskussion Kaffeepause **Thomas Lux**: *Was können Ökonomen von der Physik lernen?* **Meinard Kuhlmann**: *Strukturelle Mechanismen-Wissenschaftphilosophische Überlegungen* Replik Thomas Lux Plenumsdiskussion	**Dienstag / Tuesday, 15.09.** **15:30 – 18:30** **Universität Bremen SFG 2040** 15:30 – 15:35 15:35 – 15:55 15:55 – 16:15 16:15 – 16:25 16:25 – 16:55 16:55 – 17:10 17:10 – 17:30 17:30 – 17:50 17:50 – 18:00 18:00 – 18:30	
E	**Nominalistic Theories of Properties** **Thomas Hofweber:** *The Domain of Metaphysics and the Ontological Question about Properties* **Joseph Melia:** *Metaphysics, Conceptual Analysis and Paraphrase* **Cian Dorr:** *Why must an Duplicate of an Electron Be an Electron?*	**Dienstag / Tuesday, 15.09.** **15:30 – 18:30** **Universität Bremen SFG 2030** 15:30 – 16:30 16:30 – 17:30 17:30 - 18:30	
	Neuro–Enhancement: The Natural as a Value? **Bettina Schöne-Seifert**: Introduction **John Dupré**: *Illusions of Normality* **Bill Fulford**: *Delusion and Spiritual Experience: A Case study in Values-Based Medicine (VBM) and its Implications for Neuro-Enhancement* Coffee break **Dieter Birnbacher**: *What is Behind Intrinsic Objections Against Enhancement?* Plenary discussion	**Dienstag / Tuesday, 15.09** **15:30 – 18:30** **Universität Bremen SFG 1040** 15:30 – 15:45 15:45 – 16:15 16:15 – 16:45 16:45 – 17:00 17:00 – 17:30 17:30 – 18:30	

A Code

Aristole on Explanatory Grounding of Existence

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Although we can correctly say of something that it exists, for Aristotle there is no universal attribute of existence that it possesses. Some things are ontologically fundamental substances, and their existence is a brute fact. By way of contrast, other objects are non-fundamental and as such have fundamental objects (substances) that underlie their existence. For instance, although there are colors, their existence is not basic and hence requires explanation. The existence of a color is grounded in the fact that some physical object has a surface that has a certain ratio of light and dark. Aristotle arrives at this account by attempting to provide an account of the cause of the perceptual awareness of colors in animals. This is an instance of a more general methodological approach according to which the existence of properties and events is explained by reference to causes of what is familiar to us pre-theoretically.

A Nortmann

Systematiker und Historiker der Philosophie: Was sehen die einen, das die anderen nicht sehen?

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The talk will address, in a general attitude, the topic of how a theoretically fruitful interplay of historically and systematically informed endeavorings in philosophy can be plausibly conceived. The general points to be made will be illustrated by examples taken from Aristotle's metaphysics and his logic.

Rapp A

On Aristotelian Themes in Contemporary Ethics

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Through the last decades Aristotle's ethics received a surprising amount of attention. Contemporary moral philosophers kept referring to Aristotle for his notions of virtue, happiness, practical wisdom or for his supposed naturalism. This talk will explore a few examples of how Aristotle 'inspired' the contemporary debate. It will also attempt to account for the typical processes by which antique philosophical theorems are 'rediscovered' and 'imported' into current philosophical debates.

Garcia-Carpintero B

Relativism, the Open Future, and Propositional Truth

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John MacFarlane has built a case for truth-relativism on the a priori possibility of the Open Future. In his first paper "Future Contingents and Relative Truth" (2003), he argued about a notion of utterance truth. In "Truth in the Garden of Forking Paths" (2008), he claims: (i) that a convincing argument should be rather based on a disquotational notion of propositional truth, (ii) which makes available to the truth-absolutist a convincing reply to his original 2003 argument; (iii) but there is another argument for truth-relativism, based on the semantics of 'actually'. Here I will reject (iii), but mostly I will argue that we truth-absolutists should decline to accept the "gift" in (ii). I hope thereby to contribute to clarifying the issues at stake, especially regarding (i).

B Kölbel

Context Sensitivity, Relativism and Future Contingents

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Recent relativist proposals involve the claim that we should postulate contents of thought and speech (propositions) that vary in their truth-value not only, as is familiar, with a possible world, but also with some non-standard parameters. For example, it is proposed that the truth-value of propositions expressed by sentences like "Labskaus is tasty" or "The treasure might be under the palm tree" or "Peter knows that he has hands" vary, respectively, with parameters such as a standard of taste, a state of information or a standard of knowledge.

It is sometimes suggested that the mere fact that it is truth that is relativized shows that these proposals constitute a radical departure from standard semantic frameworks. But semanticists generally relativize sentential truth, and relativizing the truth of propositions is far from unprecedented: propositions are standardly thought to vary in truth-value with a possible world, and the idea is at least familiar that there should be tensed propositions, i.e. propositions that change in truth-value over time, or de se propositions, i.e. propositions that vary in truth-value with an agent. So what is all the fuss about?
In addition to novel factors on which the truth of a proposition is to depend, some relativist proposals also involve a second novelty which is potentially more radical. In the more familiar cases, such as contingent and tensed propositions, we can say that the world or time with respect to which a contentful utterance or state is to be evaluated is determined by the context of that utterance or state.

Thus, the time with respect to which my assertion or belief that I am hungry is to be evaluated is the time of the assertion or the time of the belief. Some relativist proposals, however, seem to involve the thesis that in some cases no such privileged value of a truth-determining factor is determined. Thus there might be no privileged standard of taste with respect to which an utterance of "Labskaus is tasty" is to be evaluated. Such a further claim would constitute a more radical departure from standard frameworks (and has been labelled "radical relativism" by Recanati, "genuine relativism" by MacFarlane).

After providing some background for those not familiar with this debate, I shall argue for the following two points: (a) while for many of the cases, the radical move may not be needed, there are compelling reasons that it is needed in the case of utterances or mental states concerning the contingent future. (b) The resulting radical relativism faces a challenge that was set by Evans in his paper "Does tense logic rest on a mistake?". I shall attempt to show that Evans' challenge can be overcome.

McKenzie Alexander C

Moral Behaviour: The Remarkable Outcome of Imitation in Socially Structured Environments

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One of the great problems in providing rational choice foundations for morality is the diversity of the explicandum. Consider the following five types of moral action: cooperation, trust, fair allocation of resources in symmetric or asymmetric decision problems, and retribution. These five types of moral actions correspond to particular choices of strategy used when playing the Prisoner's Dilemma, the Stag Hunt, the Nash demand game (either the symmetric or asymmetric version), or the Ultimatum game. Yet from a rational choice point of view, those types of actions have very different properties. Choosing to cooperate in the Prisoner's Dilemma is not a Nash equilibrium (and hence not rational). Choosing to trust in the Stag Hunt is a Nash equilibrium, but it is only one of three (so it may be rational, depending on what you believe). Choosing fair division in the Nash demand game is a Nash equilibrium, but one of infinitely many. Choosing retributive behaviour in the Ultimatum game is not a Nash equilibrium (and, hence, also not rational). Given such diversity, one might wonder how it is possible to provide a coherent and unified explanation of these

types of actions within the theory of rational choice. I will show that imitative learning by boundedly rational individuals in socially structured environments suffices.

C Nichols

Ethics and the Psychology of Moral Luck

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It seems plausible that people only deserve blame for outcomes that are under their control. However, we are also inclined to blame people more when their actions produce bad outcomes, even when the outcome was a result of bad luck. This tension underwrites the problem of moral luck. Recent empirical work attempts to uncover the factors that influence how outcomes impact our judgments of blame and punishment. One empirically-based view holds that outcome influences blame judgments only by affecting our *epistemic* evaluation of the agent (Royzman and Kumar 2004). I will argue against this epistemic account and defend the alternative view that the influence of outcome on blame is the result of an entrenched and phylogenetically old system (Cushman 2008). This "old-system" view, I'll suggest, bears on normative ethics. For normative ethics often proceeds by granting normative authority to deeply held moral beliefs, even in the absence of justifications for those deeply held beliefs. If outcome-based blame judgments depends on an old, entrenched system, this suggests that the judgments run deep in our moral psychology. In light of this, I will argue against globally reversing the influence of bad luck on our judgments of blame.

C Stich

The Evolution of Morality?

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In "A Framework for the Psychology of Norms," Chandra Sripada and I developed a theory about the psychological mechanisms underlying human norms. If that theory is on the right track, people will often internalize norms that reduce their own biological fitness. It might be thought that no such psychological mechanism could possibly evolve. But that would be a mistake. In this talk I'll explain why it was all but inevitable that natural selection would lead to norm psychology in our species, once we had acquired the ability to learn from one another. The account I'll offer explains why many human norms foster cooperative or prosocial behavior. It also explains why many human norms lead to ethnic hatred and morally repugnant behavior. If the account is correct, these norms will be very difficult to dislodge.

Bornholdt D

Dynamik komplexer Systeme: Modelle und Sichtweisen der Physik

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Neue Forschungsrichtungen wie Econophysics, Soziophysik oder Biologische Physik beruhen wesentlich auf der Anwendung von Methoden der Physik auf die Modellierung komplexer dynamischer Systeme. Beispiele reichen von Märkten, sozialen Netzwerken oder dem Internet, bis zu komplexen biologischen Systemen, vom Genom zum Gehirn, von Evolution zu Ökosystem und Gesellschaft. Was kann die physikalische Sichtweise hier bewirken? Einige Fallbeispiele sollen Chancen und Grenzen illustrieren.

Kuhlmann D

Strukturelle Mechanismen – Wissenschaftsphilosophische Überlegungen

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Die Econophysics ist eine von mehreren seit einigen Jahren florierenden interdisziplinären Forschungsbereichen, die dadurch ermöglicht werden,

dass in vollkommen verschiedenen Gegenstandsbereichen sehr ähnliche dynamische Muster auftreten. Die Zeitentwicklung von komplexen Systemen mit vielen wechselwirkenden Bestandteilen kann Charakteristika aufweisen, die verblüffend unabhängig von der materiellen Beschaffenheit des Systems ist. Für die Wissenschaftsphilosophie stellt dies eine Herausforderung dar, da die gängigen Modelle der Erklärung nicht greifen. Naturgesetze spielen keine tragende Rolle und selbst kausale Modelle, welche die Identifikation von Mechanismen in den Vordergrund stellen, werden der Universalität des Verhaltens dynamisch komplexer Systeme nicht gerecht. Ein Ausweg besteht darin, Mechanismen strukturell zu konzipieren.

D Lux

Was können Ökonomen von der Physik lernen?

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Wichtige empirische Daten des Wirtschaftslebens weisen statistische Charakteristika auf, die denen komplexer Systeme in den Naturwissenschaften ähneln. Das prominenteste Beispiel hierfür ist die Verteilung großer Preisausschläge auf Finanzmärkten, die von einem für alle Märkte etwa gleichen hyperbolischen Abfall gekennzeichnet sind. Ähnlich universelles Verhalten findet sich in der zeitlichen Abhängigkeit der Volatilität (des Schwankungsgrades der Kurse) wie auch in der Verteilung von Einkommen, Vermögen und Firmengrößen. All diese Eigenheiten können als sogenannte Skalierungsgesetze beschrieben werden, die man in den Naturwissenschaften in komplexen Systemen mit einer Vielzahl interagierender Elemente findet. Die Analyse der Selbstorganisationsprozesse dieser Systeme bietet einen allgemeinen theoretischen Zugang zur Erklärung der empirischen Beobachtungen. Diese in den Naturwissenschaften verbreitete Sicht steht allerdings in Widerspruch zur etablierten Praxis der Wirtschaftstheorie, auf die Modellierung von Interaktionen zwischen Wirtschaftssubjekten zu verzichten und das Wirtschaftsgeschehen anhand eines einzelnen ‚repräsentativen' Akteurs darzustellen. Dieser historisch gewachsene *konzeptionelle Reduktionismus* verhindert ein Verständnis von ökonomischen Problemen (wie der gegenwärtigen Finanzkrise) als Resultat der unkoordinierten Wechselwirkungen vieler unabhängig agierender Akteure.

Stöckler D

Einleitung

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Der Einsatz von leistungsfähigen Rechnern hat viele Wissenschaften verändert. Die weit verbreiteten Computersimulationen sind ein bekanntes Beispiel dafür. Dabei wurden neue Methoden zur Analyse von Prozessen entwickelt, die früher höchstens qualitativ verstanden werden konnten. In diesem Kolloquium sollen Untersuchungen zu „komplexen Dynamiken" im Mittelpunkt stehen, die auf unerwarteten Methodenübertragungen basieren (z. B. aus der statistischen Physik in die Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften). Da die Wissenschaftstheorie traditionell an den fundamentalen Wissenschaften (vor allem an der Theoretischen Physik) orientiert war, sind die neuen Methoden und die damit verbundenen wissenschaftstheoretischen Fragen bisher noch wenig diskutiert worden.
In diesem Kolloquium sollen zwei Wissenschaftler (ein Physiker, ein Ökonom) und zwei Wissenschaftsphilosophen darüber zu einem fruchtbaren Austausch kommen. Was sind komplexe Dynamiken? Welche Bedeutung haben sie im Kontext der jeweiligen Wissenschaft? Worin besteht z. B. die Erklärungskraft von Übertragungen von Methoden z. B. aus der Physik in die Ökonomie? Gibt es andere Formen der Universalität neben Naturgesetzen? Muss man strukturellen Elementen in den Wissenschaften eine besondere Bedeutung zuweisen oder handelt es sich einfach um besonders raffinierte Anwendungen mathematischer Methoden?

E Busse

Einleitung

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Both in ordinary talk and in science we seem to assume that there are properties. We say that two persons have a lot in common, apparently meaning that there exist several traits of character they share. Physicists say that electrons can be in different spin states, apparently meaning that there exists a range of such states. (Radical) nominalism about properties is the view that in fact there are no such things as properties that can be had by several persons or things. The aim of the colloquium is to discuss the achievements and problems of alternative nominalist approaches to properties. Some questions that arise are the following: are we in ordinary and scientific talk really committed to the truth of statements in which we apparently assume properties? If so, should these statements be interpreted literally or rather as elliptical, perhaps as consequences of conditionals that have a theory of properties as their antecedent, or as metaphorical? If statements about properties have to be taken literally, how should the quantification over properties be construed in order to avoid ontological commitment to properties? Can the quantification be paraphrased in ontologically neutral terms, or is it unanalysable and *sui generis*? Is it possible to formulate systematic truth conditions for apparent statements about properties that reveal them as ontologically non-committal?
The three speakers of the colloquium, Thomas Hofweber (Chapel Hill), Joseph Melia (Leeds), and Cian Dorr (Oxford), favour different approaches to nominalism. They all combine substantial work on properties and abstract entities in general with meta-metaphysical reflection.

E Melia

Metaphysics, Conceptual Analysis and Paraphrase

Joseph Melia

Nominalism is a paradise for the ontologically parsimonious. But the Nominalist has been accused of having to mangle ordinary thought and language, of being committed to ugly, overly complex philosophical theories, and of being unable to do justice to the Physical Sciences and Philosophical Theory. These seem like a high price to pay just to satisfy a taste for desert landscapes.

In this talk, I'll examine the seriousness of these concerns, and look at the degree to which considerations from language, both ordinary and formal, should shape and constrain our metaphysical picture of the world. Though I am sympathetic to nominalist strategies that do not involve paraphrase, there are weaknesses and drawbacks in such an approach which require investigation.

Birnbacher F

What is Behind Intrinsic Objections Against Enhancement?

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In the bioethical debate about enhancement extrinsic and consequentialistarguments predominate. There is a clear preponderance of arguments aboutpotentially risky individual and social developments and about risks tothe integrity of medicine. This applies, too, to the distinctions, usually-interpreted as normatively meaningful, between moderate and radical,compensatory and non-compensatory, invasive und non-invasive Enhancement.In contrast, the present contribution concentrates on the intrinsic andmore specific arguments against Enhancement, which are paramount inconservative statements (like that of the President's Council), among themarguments that appeal, explicitly or implicitly, to principles such asnaturalness, authenticity, and the difference between health and disease.>From a functionalist point of view the thesis is put forward that thesearguments cannot be supported, mainly on account of their essentialist presuppositions, but that they can be interpreted as portmanteau arguments for consequentialist arguments that deserve to be taken seriously.

F Dupré

Illusions of Normality

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Critics of enhancement assume implicitly or explicitly that there is some discoverable state of the (human) organism which constitutes normality. However, recent insights into the complexity of the relationship between the organism and its environment, and the sensitivity of organismal development to features of the environment, suggest that this assumption is misguided. On the other hand proponents of enhancement are liable to make the same naïve assumptions about the intrinsic nature of normality, differing only in their view as to the normative significance of normality. Both sides in the debate would benefit for a more sophisticated view of the relational (and processual) character of the organism. In this talk, such a view will be sketched with reference to both the genome and the brain.

F Fulford

Delusion and Spiritual Experience: a Case Study in Values-Based Medicine (VBM) and its Implications for Neuro-Enhancement

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In the traditional medical model, diagnosis has been assumed to be a matter exclusively for natural science and hence (according to this model) to be value-free. In this presentation the case history of a man (called Simon) will be presented in which the diagnosis, as between delusion and genuine religious experience, will be shown to turn crucially not on the facts (though these are also important), but on a series of value judgements. Drawing on the resources of Oxford linguistic analytic philosophy, Simon's case history will be used to illustrate the pervasiveness of values, alongside evidence, in one of the most scientific of classifications of mental disorder, the American Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM). This in turn will be generalised to a model of medicine in which values stand alongside and on equal basis with evidence in all aspects of clinical decision making.
Examples of the impact on this Values-Based Medicine model in mental health policy and practice in the UK will be briefly described and the implications of this approach for neuro-enhancement will be outlined.